Conflict in commons: collective action and institutions

Abstract

Common pool resources (CPRs)are safe-guards and foundation for rural livelihood especially for the developing nationslike India. Cooperation is needed to conserve CPRs due to its very features. Community institutions sometimes faceconflictsto conserve commons cost-effectively. But,are conflicts always detrimental? Do they alwayshamper the local governance of commons?We have tried to view from close the activities of commons users and others and tried to understand the underlying symphonythereafter. In doing so,we have conducteda primary survey on 419 users of canal water, community forest and tank water in 11 CPRsdependent villages from West Bengal, India. We observed positive relations between conflict and collective action inconservation of commons. This finding seems to be conflicting with the notion that,conflict undermines collective action and therewith the potential for sustainability. We examined and foundthat successful informal communities are more conflictive and at the same time cooperativethan formal one.We tried to see the working of different factors influencing collective action and conflicts. We also viewed the role of formal and informal institution in this orchestra of CPRs. The occurrencesof supply, demand and policy side conflicts and conflict resolution methods are also not significantly different between formal and informal institutions. Therefore, conflict and informal institution havesome positive impact for the successful conservation. We suggest that authorities have to study the nature and types of conflicts before implementing rules and institutional arrangements thereafter